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The collapse of Argentina’s currency is a terrible tragedy, and not just for the big 
international investors who stand to lose a bundle. The Argentine people have paid 
dearly.  Their economy has been in severe recession for four years, with unemployment 
approaching 20 percent. And because of their government’s mishandling of the crisis, the 
economic situation will almost certainly worsen before it gets better. 
  The occasional currency bubble may or may not be an inherent downside to 
market capitalism: distinguished economists have argued both sides of this issue.  What is 
clear, however, is that much can be done to make such crises less frequent and less 
costly.  Hence it is important to take the measure of the recent rash of international 
financial crises, of which Argentina is the latest.   
  Many on the political left needed little time to distill the complex factors that led 
to Argentina’s recent financial mess to a simple lesson.  To them devaluation and default 
were just further proof of the bankruptcy of the neoliberal economic ideology at the heart 
of the so-called Washington consensus – the principles that guide the U.S. Treasury and 
the Washington-based international organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.  The severe financial contagion that many policymakers 
feared would follow an Argentinean default has failed to materialize. But there is still a 
danger of an even more damaging type of contagion, which has been variously labeled 
intellectual or political contagion.  From the perspective of the left, Argentina’s trauma   2
demonstrates the need for national governments to turn their backs on the market and 
return to statist strategies. 
  So far, enthusiasm for the old ways has remained more the mantra of leftist 
intellectuals than an influence on people who make policy.  True, the efforts of the 
International Monetary Fund to raise the principle of free international capital flows to 
the same exalted level as free trade has suffered a severe setback in the wake of 
Argentina. However, with the notable exception of Malaysia, the crisis countries of the 
late 1990s have resisted the impulse to regulate capital and to protect domestic industry.  
This has even been true of Russia, despite frightening early signs of a sharp reversal in 
policy.  
Political analysts suggest, however, that the Argentine crisis presents a much 
more serious threat of policy reversals across Latin America. By this argument, Latin 
America is especially subject to policy fads.  Liberal economic policies spread with little 
resistance throughout much of Latin America during the 1990’s, but few of the political 
leaders and parties who initiated this change in direction are still in power.  Thus, the 
thinking goes, a reversion to statism could occur just as rapidly.  
  Argentina’s quick successions of governments since the crisis began illustrate the 
tension. The voices of populists, who blame the crisis on foreign corporations and banks, 
have been heard along with those of soberer analysts calling for the government to bring 
its fiscal house into order.  Protectionist rhetoric and dark mutterings about the virtues of 
confiscating the equity of the banking system compete for attention with the hard reality 
of currency depreciation. The government’s initial plan to jerry-rig a dual exchange rate,   3
with one rate for trade and one for capital flows, has given way to a unified exchange 
rate.  
The IMF and U.S. Treasury have wisely been biding their time, refusing to 
support new financial assistance for Argentina until a credible and consistent economic 
policy strategy is put in place.  In the meantime, the Argentine economy has virtually 
ground to a halt. The banks, whose debts far exceed their assets, are not lending; rather 
than force them to close their doors, the government has sharply limited withdrawals. 
Many corporations are slowing or halting production because they cannot obtain critical 
materials: you just can’t sell good wine if you don’t have corks to seal the bottles. 
  How did Argentina’s seeming economic miracle of the early 1990’s end in such a 
catastrophe? Argentina is experiencing two distinct, but reinforcing, crises.  One was 
triggered by the insolvency of the government, which led it to default on loans.  The other 
was overvaluation of the currency, which finally forced devaluation.   
Argentina’s fiscal distress was due in large part to the government’s failure to 
collect taxes. Cheating has cost the government on the order of 40 percent of it expected 
revenues. That, however, never stopped Argentina’s political leaders from buying power 
with a combination of populist spending programs and slush fund outlays to political 
allies. Profligacy at the top was mirrored by excessive spending in the provinces, where 
politicians refused to accept orders from Buenos Aires to put on the fiscal brakes.  The 
free spending policies of the administration of Fernando de la Rúa elected in the late 
1990s were the final straw. 
  The long recession, which was made worse by the overvaluation of the Argentine 
peso (and the resulting inability of domestic producers to compete successfully at home   4
or abroad), made the budget situation even worse.  The downturn in the economy reduced 
tax revenues, while the poor prospects for recovery raised worries about how the 
government debt would be repaid.  These concerns reduced capital inflows and forced 
greater monetary contraction, worsening the recession.   
The deepening recession, in turn, began to raise doubts about the willingness or 
ability of the government to stick by its decade-old commitment to lock the value of the 
peso to the U.S. dollar.  Fear of devaluation raised interest rates in pesos, while fear of 
default also raised interest rates on the government’s considerable dollar-denominated 
debt.  Higher interest rates increased the budget deficit and further worsened the outlook 
for avoiding default.  Thus a vicious circle of worsening conditions and expectations spun 
out of control.  
Two major planks of the Washington consensus preached by the IMF and the U.S 
Treasury are fiscal responsibility and the avoidance of over-valued exchange rates. It was 
not the failure of these doctrines, but the failure to follow them that led to Argentina’s 
crisis. Not surprisingly, the Argentine government tried to shift the blame by charging 
that the crisis was all the fault of speculators and assorted foreigners. As the crisis 
mounted the government’s official line was that the only real problem was excessive 
pessimism on the part of investors and depositors.  If confidence could just be restored, 
went the party line, the hemorrhage of funds from the banks would stop and a virtuous 
circle could be initiated. 
Market panics triggered by misinformation do occur on occasion. But this was not 
one of those occasions: the underlying problems scaring depositors and investors were all 
too real. And government policies did little to solve them.  Under IMF pressure, the   5
government did make a stab at budget cutting, but the legislature and the provinces dug in 
their heels to such an extent that most of the psychological benefits of the government 
budget actions were nullified.  Tactical mistakes further undermined confidence – among 
them, economic czar Domingo Cavallo’s call for linking the exchange value of the peso 
to an average of the dollar and the euro.  This was read by many as a crack in the 
government’s commitment to avoid devaluation; yet floating the idea did nothing to 
remedy the immediate problem of overvaluation. Indeed, it was hard to avoid the 
impression that the government was just playing for time because it didn’t know what to 
do. As might be expected, the government’s impulse to put on a happy face fooled hardly 
anyone. 
Argentina’s problems may not be evidence that the free market model is bankrupt, 
as leftist intellectuals would have us believe, but there is a certain degree of truth to their 
condemnations.  Argentina’s tragedy does suggest the bankruptcy of a particular type of 
economic ideology that has been promulgated by a small group of economists -- and the 
editorial page of The Wall Street Journal.  
Proponents of this view – what I call Fixed Rate Fundamentalism –argue that 
sound money is the key to economic success, and that a fixed exchange rate is the key to 
sound money.  A few decades ago such arguments were promulgated primarily by those 
advocating a return to the gold standard.  In recent years the mechanisms of choice have 
become the adoption of currency boards, or the replacement of the national currency with 
a strong foreign currency like the U.S. dollar.   
A currency board is a kissing cousin to a precious metal standard. Under a 
currency board regime, a country fixes the value of its currency to another and allows its   6
own money supply to expand or contract only as its central bank’s holdings of the foreign 
currency rise or fall.  This is basically the same mechanism as the gold standard of the 
19
th century, with a foreign currency placing the role of the metal. For Estonia, the choice 
was the German mark (and now with the implementation of the European Monetary 
Union, the euro). For Argentina, the choice was the dollar. 
  The adoption of a currency board or dollarization, as the outright adoption of a 
foreign currency as your own is called, is sometimes a wise policy. But the operative 
word is “sometimes.”  A currency board has worked well in Estonia. But the fixed rate 
fundamentalists recommend currency boards as a solution for just about everyone and 
everything.  
  The Typical Cause of Currency Crises: Falsely Fixed Exchange Rates 
  Before turning to the case of Argentina, we should note that the proximate cause 
of the Argentine crises differed in one fundamental respect from that of most major 
currency crises of the 1990’s – the European Monetary System in 1992 and 1993, Mexico 
in 1994, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999.  All these crises resulted from 
the failure of national governments to respect what has become widely known as the 
unholy trinity theorem of international monetary relations.  The theorem says that the 
laws of nature and arithmetic won’t allow countries simultaneously to pursue fixed 
exchange rates, independent national monetary policies, and free international capital 
flows.   
The reason governments so often fail to heed this theorem is that it only applies to 
the medium- or long-term.  In the short run, countries can use international currency 
reserves (from its own central bank, or borrowed from public and private sources) to   7
finance international payments imbalances.  If these imbalances are temporary, stopgap 
finance gives countries the ability to avoid changes in either their exchange rates or their 
monetary policies.  And since either is typically seen by government officials as being 
costly, they tend to adopt overly optimistic judgments of what is temporary -- especially 
if an election is on the horizon.  As a result, governments tend to wait too long to 
acknowledge the seriousness of international payments problems. 
Unencumbered by such political considerations, international market participants 
– everyone from hedge fund speculators to risk-averse corporations -- generally 
recognize that a currency is seriously out of line long before governments take action.  
Thus while the timing is uncertain, the direction of major changes in pegged exchange 
rates are usually clear. This paradise for speculators is known as the one-way gamble. It 
is what allowed George Soros to take home almost one billion dollars from the British 
Treasury in the early 1990’s, which was vainly attempted to defend the value of the 
pound. And it is widely regarded as a major reason for the breakdown in the early 1970’s 
of the system of pegged (but adjustable) exchange rates established at the end of World 
War II.   
  The designers of this Bretton Woods system (named after the town in New 
Hampshire where it was negotiated) didn’t worry about currency speculation because 
they assumed controls on capital flows imposed during the war would be remain in place. 
As capital market liberalization proceeded, however, so did the frequency of currency 
crises.  Thus in today’s world of substantial capital mobility, most economists believe 
that what can be called falsely fixed exchange rate regimes virtually guarantee periodic 
currency crises.     8
The adoption of “crawling pegs” that allow small, frequent changes in exchange 
rates offers a way to diffuse pressures on currencies, especially when the rules call allow 
a substantial margin for fluctuation above and below parities (crawling bands).  These 
aren’t always sufficient to avoid crisis, however.  While Thailand had an old-fashioned 
narrow band fixed peg before the forced baht devaluation began the east Asian currency 
crisis, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Russia all had versions of crawling bands or 
pegs.  In principle, the members of the European Monetary System also had scope to use 
more flexible arrangements and had indeed done so in the early days of the EMS, but by 
the late 1980’s the system had ossified into the traditional narrow band adjustable peg 
variety. 
  This combination of theory and experience has led to the popularity among 
international monetary economists of what is called the “unstable middle” or the “two 
corners” hypothesis.  In this view, bad exchange rate policy wasn’t always the only cause 
for the rash of international currency crisis during the 1990’s, but it was an important 
contributor in all of the major ones.  Thus one need not invoke evil speculators or 
inherent market instability, just the simple failure of governments to remember the 
lessons from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system two decades before. 
The policy recommendation that follows is straightforward. Countries should 
avoid the unstable middle of falsely fixed exchange rates and move toward one of the two 
corner solutions: genuinely fixed or fully flexible exchange rates.  Economists differ at 
present over whether it is necessary to move all the way to one extreme or the other, or 
only to move away from the dead center of the narrow band adjustable peg. But the   9
Argentine case certainly suggests that avoiding the unstable middle is not a sufficient 
condition for avoiding currency crises. 
Some fixed-rate enthusiasts argue that Argentina just didn’t go far enough: if the 
government had made the U.S. dollar the official currency, the crisis would have been 
avoided.  We’ll see, however, that while the relative merits of currency boards and 
dollarization are worth debating, the idea that dollarization would have saved Argentina 
is far-fetched. 
 
The False Promise of Exchange Rate Based Stabilization 
  Why did so many governments fail to heed the lessons of the breakdown of the 
Breton Woods system?  This is an under-explored question, but there’s little doubt that 
economists are partly to blame. Several influential theoretical papers, along with the 
apparent success of some western European and several developing countries in using 
pegged exchange rates to control inflation during the 1980’s, gave rise to a widespread 
view that pegging the exchange rate was the best option for stabilizing prices.  The 
buzzwords were “exchange rate based stabilization” (ERBS) or the need to use the 
exchange rate as a “nominal anchor” for the domestic economy.  These views not only 
had a major impact on the academy, but were actively promoted by governments of the 
European Monetary System and found favor with some top officials at the International 
Monetary Fund.  In turn, many emerging market economies fell prey to its attraction. 
ERBS is not an inherently dumb strategy. The initial effects tend to be an 
economic boom accompanied by a rapid deceleration of inflation.  It doesn’t take a rocket   10
scientist to favor good times and rapidly falling inflation over a recession and continuing 
inflation.  No wonder ERBS strategies were so popular.   
There was a dirty little secret, however, discovered by researchers but not 
emphasized in most policy advice. While inflation tended to fall rapidly after fixed rates 
were imposed, it rarely fell rapidly enough to prevent the currency from becoming 
overvalued. As exports lost competitiveness, the booms turned to busts and currency 
crises followed.   
Crawling as opposed to fixed pegs literally offered a bit of wiggle room, but 
political considerations typically kept governments from allowing currencies to 
depreciate rapidly enough.  This problem was reinforced by the behavior of international 
financial markets, because investors frequently failed to take a long view. Thus with the 
initial success of stabilization policies, capital tended to rush in. And these surges 
typically masked the deterioration in the country’s competitive position.   
Of course this usually wasn’t the whole story behind the rise and eventual fall.  
Often there were other contributing factors beyond a country’s control, such as the 
appreciation of the dollar (which overpriced dollar-linked currencies) and depreciation of 
competitors’ currencies, which added to the problems facing Argentina and Thailand. In 
the case of Russia, the decline of oil prices hit hard. And in the case of Mexico, the 
tightening of U.S. monetary policy (which raised capital costs) and a political 
assassination in the run-up to elections made a difference. But the basic pattern of ERBS 
is too clear to miss: extraordinary success early, failure later.   
Some countries have managed to beat the odds by adopting sufficient exchange 
rate flexibility (Poland) or by making a genuine fixed exchange rate work over the long   11
run (Estonia). But the examples of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are more 
representative. Argentina’s commitment to a fixed exchange rate via its currency board 
delayed the currency crisis for much longer than is typical with ERBS.  But this turned 
out to be more of a cost than a benefit.  It would have been much better if the current 
crisis had come several years earlier, saving the Argentine people years of recession. 
  I have little doubt that top officials such as Domingo Cavallo, the original 
architect of the currency board who was brought back to try to save the system, genuinely 
believed that devaluation and default could be avoided. But few economists outside of the 
Argentine government, save a small band of fixed rate fundamentalists, shared this view.   
    
   Fixed Exchange Rates: Not for Everyone 
  To understand why most economists didn’t share Cavallo’s optimism, we need to 
look briefly at what economists call the theory of optimal currency areas. The central 
insight of OCA theory is that there is not one best exchange rate system for all countries. 
There are costs as well as benefits to all exchange regimes, and the ratio of these will 
vary systematically across countries according to factors identified by the theory.  Fixed 
rate fundamentalists tend to focus only on the costs of flexible exchange rates and the 
benefits of fixed rates. (Of course some flexible rate enthusiasts do just the opposite).   
The early contributions to OCA theory focused on two major considerations: the 
size and openness of the economy, and the flexibility of its internal adjustment 
mechanisms.  Under fixed exchange rates, domestic production is forced to respond to 
signals from international markets, while under flexible rates the international sector does 
most of the adjustment.  Which sector should adjust to the other?     12
Clearly this depends in part on their relative size. For a tiny economy like Estonia, 
where the international sector is large relative to purely domestic economic activity, a 
fixed exchange rate makes the most sense. But with a large economy like the United 
States, it’s just the opposite.  While our international trade and investment is large in 
absolute terms, it is small compared to the domestic economy.  Thus fixing exchange 
rates in the United States would amount to letting the tail wag the dog. 
Under fixed exchange rates, the international sector dominates the domestic sector 
through the effects of the balance of payments on the national money supply.  Under any 
system of truly fixed exchange rates such as the gold standard or currency boards or 
dollarization, balance of payments surpluses directly lead to increases in the national 
money supply, while payments deficits cause decreases. With highly flexible wages and 
prices and high labor mobility, these changes in the money supply cause the price level to 
increase or decrease in tandem. That, in turn, corrects the payments imbalance. 
This is an old tale told often, one that originates with the great philosopher David 
Hume in the 18
th century. But the model breaks down when domestic labor markets are 
not highly flexible.  Then the monetary contraction caused by a balance of payments 
deficit causes recession rather than falling wages. This is just what happened to 
Argentina. 
  Argentina’s decision to adopt a currency board in the early 1990’s was defensible.  
The economic situation was desperate: repeated efforts to bring hyperinflation under 
control had failed and the government had little credibility. Thus there was a strong case 
for taking the printing presses out of the hands of policymakers.     13
There are many ways to do this. But with some justification, it was felt that faith 
in government was so low that less decisive measures such as the creation of an 
independent central bank or the adoption of a firm set of marching orders for the central 
bank (à la Milton Friedman) would just not be taken seriously. Thus the adoption of the 
currency board seemed the only credible way to produce sound money. In any event, the 
rapid depreciation of the Argentine currency had led already to widespread use of the 
dollar by Argentines. Thus the creation of a dollar-based currency board seemed the 
obvious solution. 
  In its early years the experiment proved a wonderful success.  Inflation was 
conquered and growth soared. Add a lot of talk and some action on privatizing industry 
and deregulating markets to the brew, and it is clear why Argentina became a darling of 
international investors.  By the time worries about the soundness of their investments set 
in, the bonds of the national and provincial governments of Argentina accounted for 
almost one fourth of the international holdings of government debt from all emerging 
market countries. 
  As discussed above, initial success with exchange rate-based stabilization is not 
unusual.  This success can easily generate a false sense of security, however. While 
Argentina did score well on the OCA criteria of large private holdings of foreign 
currency, other important OCA criteria suggested problems.  Argentina was – and is -- 
one of the most closed economies for its size on the planet. Its exports still don’t exceed 
ten percent of its GDP.   
Some have argued that the market’s concerns about excessive government debt 
were greatly exaggerated because the ratio of Argentina’s total debt to GDP wasn’t   14
particularly high.  What this overlooks is that most of this debt is payable in US dollars, 
not Argentine pesos. And as a portion of Argentina’s foreign exchange earnings, the debt 
had indeed become dangerously high even as the overvalued peso was making it more 
difficult to export and to increase foreign exchange earnings.  
 In the apologist’s scenario the growing levels of debt were the fault of the 
Argentine government, but the overvaluation of the peso was not.  The currency board 
had been quite successful in stopping inflation in its tracks and inflation rates in 
Argentina were frequently even lower than those in the United States.  The problem was 
that the dollar had appreciated against most currencies and the peso was fixed to the 
dollar; thus the peso appreciated against the currencies of most of its trading partners. 
  Another optimal currency area criteria is that you trade a lot with the country 
whose currency you have, in effect, adopted. By this criterion (though) fixing to the 
dollar would make great sense for Canada and Mexico, but not for Argentina. Over 70 
percent of both Canada and Mexico’s trade is with the United States.  For Argentina, not 
only is the overall level of international trade quite low, only 11 percent of its exports in 
1999 found their way to the United States. Thus the peso’s appreciation against most of 
its trading partners currencies in the late 1990’s was initially driven by the rise of the 
dollar, even though Argentina’s trade with the US amounted to less than one percent of 
its economy. Argentina’s competitive position was further undermined by the large 
depreciation of the Brazilian real following its crisis in 1999. And Brazil is one of 
Argentina’s major trading partners.  
With a currency board or any other form of fixed exchange rate, if your currency 
becomes overvalued adjustment must come through changes in wages and domestic   15
prices. In Argentina, these adjustments did not go smoothly. The Argentines, with their 
history of strong, highly political unions, have never been known for flexible labor 
markets.  Thus they scored low on another important OCA criterion.  
“Don’t worry,” argued the first fixed rate fundamentalists.  What is important is 
not meeting the criteria before the fact but meeting them after.  No matter that labor 
markets are chock full of rigidities now.  Adopting a fixed rate will make the 
maintenance of such rigidities much more costly and will thus propel reform. One hears 
the same optimistic scenarios posited for the European Monetary Union. 
  While there is some truth to the argument, it misses a crucial point. The pursuit of 
economic efficiency is rarely a government’s highest priority.  Indeed, if efficiency were 
really were at the top of the list, the economic rigidities would have been dealt with long 
before currency rates made reform so critical.  
Any reform of markets inevitably generates losers as well as winners, and often as 
not, the potential losers have a lot of political influence.  Thus while the adoption of fixed 
exchange rates does tilt the balance of forces in the direction of reformers by removing an 
alternative means of adjustment, the magnitude of the shift may be slight. This is what 
happened in Argentina.  Wages and prices did become more flexible and both have been 
falling in recent years -- but not by nearly enough to avoid a serious recession. 
  This problem is even more serious with respect to fiscal policy.  With wage 
discipline, fixed rates at least shift the dynamic in the right direction.  With fiscal 
discipline, the effects are often quite perverse.  The combination of fixed exchange rates 
and high capital mobility make fiscal deficits easier to finance during their early stages.  
Thus they tend to retard rather than to increase pressures for fiscal reform.  That explains   16
why fiscal reform lagged during Italy’s early days as a member of the European 
Monetary System, and it explains why fiscal reform lagged in Argentina. Even during its 
years of wine and roses in the early-1990s, Argentina continued to run budget deficits. 
These deficits began to grow rapidly as the economy slowed, of course. Provincial 
government spending faced little pressure for restraint, and the tax collection system 
remained one of the most inefficient in Latin America. Thus the primary reason for 
default was the issuance of excess debt relative to the country’s ability to pay. In the fall 
of 2000 the financial markets began to give strong warnings of impending problems, and 
the risk premium on Argentina’s debt began to soar. But the signals came too late to avert 
a hard landing.  
Hindsight 
  The most important lesson of the Argentine crisis is that fixed rate 
fundamentalism, not open markets or the Washington consensus, failed Argentina.  
Sound money is valuable and fixed exchange rate regimes such as Argentina’s currency 
board can provide it.  Sound money, however, can neither assure the adoption of, nor 
substitute for, responsible fiscal policy.  Nor can it guarantee sufficient wage and price 
flexibility to make it possible to adjust to an overvalued currency without beggaring the 
working classes. 
  Many fixed rate fundamentalists suggested late in the game that there still was a 
way out for Argentina: scrap the national currency and adopt the dollar. Dollarization 
might have worked better than the currency board.  (The central consideration here is 
whether the gains from lower interest rates due to reduced currency risk would more than 
offset the loss in the government’s profit from issuing its own currency). But   17
dollarization could do little to solve the two major problems facing Argentina – namely 
its unsustainable fiscal situation and the overvaluation of the currency.  Thus the debate 
over dollarization was like a discussion about alternative types of cosmetic surgery while 
the badly disfigured accident victim was bleeding to death.  The only alternative to 
devaluation was continued recession – and this would have done nothing to stave off 
default. 
The Argentine crisis also suggests lessons concerning international financial 
contagion and the policies of the International Monetary Fund. These subjects can’t to be 
explored here in the detail here, but a few comments seem in order. 
  First, the policy community has exaggerated the dangers of currency crisis 
contagion.  The Asian and Russian crises were special cases that are not typical of the 
workings of the international financial markets.  Serious contagion can occur, but the 
norm is milder spillovers that cause ripples in currency and financial markets, not crises. 
The lack of serious contagion following both the recent Turkish and Argentine crises 
illustrate this point.   
  A second lesson from these recent crises is that IMF cash can’t save countries 
with fixed exchange rates that have become overvalued. The IMF should not have agreed 
to Argentina’s request for a major loan in the summer of 2001. But exaggerated fears on 
the part of many political leaders as well as some IMF officials combined with strong 
pressures from the United States led the IMF to go against the recommendations of many 
of its top economists.     18
The cost of such mistaken lending is far more than the wasted money.  It damages 
the credibility of the IMF.  Indeed, with its reputation already tainted by ill-fated loans to 
Russia, Brazil and Turkey, it is clear the IMF must learn to say no. 
  Ironically, the case for an IMF loan to Argentina may be much better now than 
before the crisis.  The Argentine people, if not their leaders, deserve help in cushioning 
the blow of the crisis, and the prospect of IMF lending could tip the scales in favor of 
sensible policies over the statist populism that has for so long been the Argentine way. 
But IMF money will help only if the new government is serious about reforms.  
The IMF must remember that actions speak louder than words, and be willing to practice 
tough love. Argentines will have to decide to make the sacrifices to break away from 
their statist past. But it is in the interests of the international community to use carrots to 
nudge them in the right direction. 